Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor by Rodriguez, Cristina M
1 
	
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM 
M A R C H  1 5 ,  2 0 1 4  
 
 
Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: 
Lessons from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) 
Sotomayor 
Cristina M. Rodríguez 
 Though courts and scholars emphasize the importance of uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of federal immigration law, systemic complexity makes 
its achievement elusive. In the immigration opinions she has drafted to date on the 
Supreme Court, as well as in her extensive work reviewing asylum adjudications on 
the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor has invoked uniformity as a means of 
promoting fairness and accountability. But she also has demonstrated how these values 
can be advanced even in uniformity’s absence, when the system produces conflict and 
divergent enforcement outcomes. Her opinions highlight how courts can meaningfully, 
albeit imperfectly, constrain administrative actors through consistent legal 
interpretation, while still accepting the diversity and discretion built into immigration 
law itself.  
 
When President Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the 
Supreme Court, commentators and senators had an extensive record of judicial 
decisions to scrutinize for evidence of the sort of Justice she might become, 
given her many years of service on the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit. Her immigration law jurisprudence, which constituted a 
significant portion of the caseload she managed while on the court of appeals, 
attracted considerable attention during the public vetting of her nomination. 
Because of the political salience of immigration law, her opinions offered a 
potential window into one of the debates that came to frame her nomination—
the compatibility between the “empathy” the President said he sought in a 
nominee and the “fidelity” to law expected of judges.  
As part of that debate, Senator Charles Schumer’s office conducted an 
analysis of her immigration decisions during her time on the Second Circuit. 
According to their analysis, in 848 asylum cases, she voted in favor of the 
government 83% of the time, putting her in line with the 17.1% remand rate of 
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the Second Circuit as a whole.1 Schumer touted these numbers as a sign that, 
“[e]ven in immigration cases, which would most test the so-called ‘empathy 
factor,’ Judge Sotomayor’s record is well within the judicial mainstream.”2 On 
the surface, then, her immigration law record arguably sufficed to conclude 
that fidelity to law, and not empathy for litigants, would drive Justice 
Sotomayor’s decision-making.  
But rarely in public discussions over judicial nominations is the weighty 
concept of fidelity meaningfully defined. In the asylum setting, is fidelity to law 
consistent with giving asylum claimants generous consideration and working 
within the bounds of the law to advance a principle of protection?3 Did 
Schumer’s framing of the issue reflect a presumption that faithful 
interpretation generally results in victory for the government?4 In general, does 
fidelity to law require uniformity or consistency in its interpretation and 
application, regardless of underlying circumstances? 
In the immigration setting, the belief that judicial interpretation should be 
geared toward promoting a systemic objective of uniformity has exerted 
powerful influence over judges and commentators alike. This occasion marking 
Justice Sotomayor’s first five years on the Supreme Court provides us with an 
opportunity to interrogate this assumption, because her immigration opinions 
simultaneously highlight the theoretical value of uniformity and the far messier 
reality of the system’s operation. Though her immigration-related work on the 
Court has been limited to date, she has written two notable immigration 
opinions—one dissent and one majority. Together with her work on the 
Second Circuit helping to superintend the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), these opinions illuminate the tension between aspiration and reality at 
the heart of immigration law.  
But rather than lament the tension, I suggest that Justice (and Judge) 
Sotomayor’s opinions demonstrate how federal courts can play a limited but 
important role in promoting consistency and transparency, if not uniformity, 
																																																								
1. Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, Schumer Unveils New Analysis Showing 
Sotomayor’s Moderate Record on Immigration Cases (June 9, 2009), http://www.schumer 
.senate.gov/Newsroom/record_print.cfm?id=314152. 
2. Id. 
3. During her confirmation hearings, Justice Sotomayor’s Second Circuit colleague, Judge 
Rosemary Pooler, was quoted as saying: “She was very thoughtful and very willing to try to 
find ways, within the tight system that has evolved, for immigrants to achieve asylum.” 
Lauren Collins, Number Nine, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com 
/reporting/2010/01/11/100111fa_fact_collins. 
4. Whether the court’s remand rate actually reflects a pro-government stand on the part of the 
Second Circuit is difficult to say without knowing much more about the underlying cases 
and exploring the particulars of the law being interpreted and the remand rates in similar 
areas of the law and in other circuits. 
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in the law’s implementation. As Justice Sotomayor has sought to do, courts can 
meaningfully, albeit imperfectly, constrain administrative actors by engaging 
in legal interpretation with uniformity concerns in mind. Importantly, 
however, courts can play this role while still accepting and perhaps even 
embracing certain forms of diversity in the administration of federal law.  
i .  the limits of uniformity as a systemic objective 
The aspiration to uniformity in the interpretation and administration of the 
law cuts across legal domains. Uniform interpretation and application of the 
law advances numerous values that an ideal version of our legal system should 
serve, including fairness, transparency, accountability, and efficiency. 
Uniformity can advance the elemental principle of fairness by providing parties 
bound by the law with notice of its content and how it will be applied. By 
promoting transparency as to the law’s meaning, uniformity helps constrain 
the discretion of executive officials and ensure that the system’s actors are held 
accountable by creating a standard against which to judge their actions. These 
constraints, in turn, help promote pragmatic values such as efficient 
administration by bringing clarity to the law and its implementation. 
Uniformity also facilitates equal treatment by subjecting the same conduct to 
the same rules or sanctions, regardless of where or when the conduct occurs. 
In immigration law, in particular, courts, advocates, and scholars often tout 
uniformity as crucial to the integrity of the system. The Supreme Court 
historically has framed the value of uniformity in terms of one voice-ism, or the 
idea that, on certain subjects, the nation must speak in unison. Uniformity 
under this view can serve systemic and expressive interests by conveying a 
unified sense of how the United States will interact with the people of the 
world. Uniformity in theory also provides a foundation for the protection of 
immigrants’ rights by advancing a clear conception of how the country 
conceptualizes the value of immigration and the status of immigrants within 
the polity.5 The defense of uniformity arises most visibly in federalism debates 
and contexts that require the assertion of federal power to control state and 
local efforts to engage in immigration regulation.6 But the aspiration to 
																																																								
5. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 377-78 (1970); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-66 (1941).  
6. This orientation has been long-standing. In a foundational case establishing the power of 
the federal government to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court emphasized that, on 
immigration and the related concerns of foreign affairs and national security, “the American 
people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing 
their interests in all these respects is the government of the Union.” Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). By the twentieth century, the idea of exclusive 
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uniformity hangs over the implementation of the federal immigration code 
itself, too.  
Promoting uniform interpretation and application of federal law 
preoccupies the federal courts.7 As Justice Scalia has written, the Court’s 
“principal responsibility . . . is to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal 
law.”8 The pursuit of uniformity requires constant vigilance by the Supreme 
Court9—a vigilance manifest most obviously in the Court’s efforts to resolve 
disagreements among the courts of appeals,10 but also in efforts to monitor 
state court interpretation of federal law.11 It also demands discipline by the 
courts of appeals, requiring them to take seriously the precedent of other courts 
and consider the value of harmonization across circuits when interpreting 
federal law.12  
																																																																																																																																						
federal control “ha[d] become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissue 
of our body politic as any aspect of our government.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 
(1954). 
7. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1567, 1580-81 n.34 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court decisions from various points in 
history that reflect an objective of promoting uniformity). 
8. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Anthony J. Bellia 
Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1554 (2006) 
(arguing that there is “an apparent constitutional presumption that a federal statute should 
have the same meaning in the first instance whether enforced in a state or a federal court”). 
9. For an argument that the Supreme Court serves as the primary guardian of this uniformity, 
see Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and 
State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1218-19 (2004). 
10. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 7, at 1569 (noting that seventy percent of the Court’s plenary 
docket involves resolution of circuit splits and emphasizing that law clerks and Justices 
identify “ensuring uniformity” as a “driving force in case selection”). 
11. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 362 (2002). 
12. The courts of appeals often recognize this imperative. See, e.g., Alternative Sys. Concepts, 
Inc. v. Synopsis, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A court of appeals should always be 
reluctant to create a circuit split without a compelling reason . . . .”); Kelton Arms Condo. 
Owners Ass’n v. Homestead Ins. Co, 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e decline to 
create a circuit split unless there is a compelling reason to do so.”). The Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure also provide that a decision’s creation of a conflict with sister courts’ 
judgments can provide a basis for en banc review. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1) (“[A] petition 
must begin with a statement that . . . the proceeding involves one or more questions of 
exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, . . . if it 
involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of 
other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.”). But even if the 
courts of appeals all acknowledged this imperative, disuniformity could still arise from state 
court interpretation of federal statutes. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L. J. 1898, 1966 (2011) 
(citing state court cases expressing faith that the Supreme Court will resolve a split in legal 
authority their decisions created). 
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But even if the presumption in favor of uniformity is warranted, uniformity 
itself proves elusive in both interpretation and administration.13 Federal 
statutes can be complex as well as poorly drafted, and in the modern era of 
delegation, Congress often leaves broad concepts undefined or relies on open-
ended standards to set the terms of regulation. For example, the definition of 
“refugee,” on which grants of asylum turn, is made up of at least eight concepts 
whose meanings are far from clear.14 Legal questions must percolate, often for 
years, before the Supreme Court elects to use its limited resources to decide a 
question.15 And even when the Court does weigh in to resolve circuit splits, its 
pronouncements often leave a great deal of space for subsequent divergence in 
interpretation based on the particular facts of different cases and ambiguities in 
the Court’s reasoning.  
In administration and law enforcement, uniformity also will be difficult to 
achieve. Factors such as the politics of different administrations, divergence in 
enforcement priorities between agencies’ central offices in Washington and 
field offices spread out across the federal bureaucracy, and disagreements 
between political leadership and the civil service all ensure that the meaning 
and content given to the law, and the extent of the law’s enforcement, will vary 
depending on context. Perhaps more important, in immigration law, as in 
many other regulatory domains, Congress actually has erected a regime whose 
design thwarts uniformity, the courts’ best efforts notwithstanding. Not only 
does the law incorporate state and local decision-makers into the system,16 it 
also makes the system of removal and relief dependent on the reach of state law 
																																																								
13. Cf. Gluck, supra note 12, at 1966 (stating that “[t]oday . . . few would contend that the Court 
adequately serves this function [of ensuring uniformity],” and citing Solimine, supra note 
11, at 353, for the proposition that grants of certiorari are rare, especially for cases decided by 
state supreme courts). 
14. To qualify as a refugee in order to be eligible for asylum, an individual must show that he 
has a (1) well-founded fear of (2) persecution (3) on account of (4) race, (5) religion, (6) 
national origin, (7) political opinion, or (8) membership in a particular social group. 
Immigration Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101 (2012). 
15. For a strong indictment of the way the federal court system’s structure undermines the value 
of uniformity, see Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to the Judicial Architecture: Modifying the 
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 640 (1989) (describing a 
“judicial tower of Babel” produced by “an appellate system with overreliance on regionally 
organized courts with every growing numbers of judges deciding an ever-swelling number 
of cases . . . subject only to the remote possibility of Supreme Court review”). But see J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke . . . , 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 69 (2010) (observing 
that “the world will not end because a few circuit splits are left unresolved”). 
16. I have discussed this phenomenon at length elsewhere. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
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and the fact of state law convictions, as well as the discretion of administrative 
actors.  
Of course, percolation and diversity can be of affirmative value in legal 
interpretation.17 Each might permit experimentation and the testing of 
competing legal theories. Elsewhere I have defended the value of diversity in 
enforcement and administration, in explorations of how federalism helps 
determine the character of various domains of social policy, including 
immigration policy.18 In this Essay, rather than revisit these debates, I present 
an account of why uniformity may not be essential to advancing all of the 
values uniformity ostensibly serves. I use the setting of immigration law—a 
domain where uniformity has enjoyed rhetorical pride of place—to make the 
point, highlighting Justice Sotomayor’s contributions to our understanding of 
that field and the role of uniformity within it.  
i i .  uniformity and integrity in justice sotomayor’s 
immigration opinions 
Perhaps the most publicly salient move Justice Sotomayor has made on the 
subject of immigration since joining the Supreme Court occurred in a case that 
had nothing to do with immigration law itself. In Mohawk Industries v. 
Carpenter, a case exploring procedural questions related to the attorney-client 
privilege, she used the term “undocumented immigrant” for what might have 
been the first time in the pages of the U.S. Reports.19 The mere choice of 
vocabulary, unaccompanied by explanation or context, drew media attention, 
because it marked a departure from the Court’s traditional and often 
unthinking use of terms such as “illegal immigrant” and “illegal alien.”  
When asked about her choice of language during a public appearance at 
Yale Law School on February 3, 2014—the lecture that followed the symposium 
																																																								
17. Cf. Frost, supra note 7, at 1606 (defending variation in interpretation “[a]s long as rules in 
various jurisdictions are clear”). 
18. See Rodríguez, supra note 16 (discussing the value of tension between federal and state law 
and differential implementation of federal law by state and local actors in relation to drug 
policy and immigration law); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (defending the value of state and local 
involvement in immigration matters on the ground that the nation’s overlapping political 
communities do not speak with one voice when it comes to how best to approach 
immigration and incorporate immigrants). 
19. 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (holding that disclosure orders adverse to attorney-client privilege do 
not qualify for immediate appeal, in a case stemming from an employee lawsuit challenging 
his termination after he informed a human resources department that the employer hired 
“undocumented immigrants” and involving a company facing a class action lawsuit for 
driving down the wages of its workers by knowingly hiring “undocumented” workers). 
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for which I prepared this Essay—she articulated a substantive theory of the 
legal significance of illegal status. She also displayed a belief in the sociological 
implications and political meaning of the language of Supreme Court 
opinions.20 She likened immigration status offenses to regulatory or 
administrative offenses and offered that every one of us is capable of violating 
(and probably has violated) rules of this kind.21 She observed that defining a 
person by his or her illegal acts degrades the individual by eliding this reality, 
which in turn enables us to ignore the fact that the status violator is entitled to 
respect as a person despite his or her immigration status.  
Justice Sotomayor’s explanation for her choice of terminology highlights 
the hybrid legal/political role of the Supreme Court as an institution, and it 
could well have an impact on the construction of the unauthorized immigrant 
in public discourse.22 Other Justices have employed similar language in recent 
cases.23 But the actual immigration law opinions Justice Sotomayor has written 
in her first five years on the Court have not been injected with the same sort of 
expressive political statements, though each position she has taken could be 
characterized as more pro-immigrant than the majority or dissent against 
which she was writing.24 In both style and substance, she has been the careful 
																																																								
20. See Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice Sotomayor, 
YALE L.J. FORUM 12-14 (Mar. 15, 2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/a 
-conversation-with-justice-sotomayor. 
21. Id. at 13. 
22. Her observations certainly attracted media attention after the fact. For coverage and 
discussion of Sotomayor’s remarks, see Steve Benen, Sonia Sotomayor’s “Allegiance,” THE 
MADDOWBLOG (Feb. 5, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow 
-show/sonia-sotomayors-allegiance; Elias Isquith, Laura Ingraham: Justice Sotomayor’s 
“Allegiance” is to “Her Immigrant Family Background” and Not the Constitution, SALON (Feb. 4, 
2014, 4:33 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/02/04/laura_ingraham_justice_sotomayors 
_allegiance_is_to_her_immigrant_family_background_and_not_the_constitution; Jim Shelton, 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor Returns to Yale to Give Lectures, NEW HAVEN REG. 
(Feb. 3, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140203/supreme 
-court-justice-sonia-sotomayor-returns-to-yale-to-give-lectures. 
23. In Arizona v. United States, for example, Justice Kennedy uses the terms “illegal 
immigration” and “illegal migration” to refer to the phenomenon, but when referring to 
persons, he uses “unauthorized workers” and “unauthorized aliens.” 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500, 
2504. 
24. Her dissent in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), which I do not discuss in detail 
here, is the most “pro-immigrant” of the few opinions she has written, in the sense of 
reaching a conclusion that would have enabled more non-citizens to challenge the 
procedural validity of their plea agreements that carried deportation consequences. Joined 
only by Justice Ginsburg, she dissented from Justice Kagan’s majority opinion holding that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), did not apply 
retroactively. In Padilla, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense 
attorneys to advise clients of the immigration consequences that could result from a guilty 
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and measured interpreter of reputation, hewing closely to traditional modes of 
statutory interpretation and self-consciously attempting to effectuate the 
schemes of Congress as written.  
These tendencies in her opinion writing ultimately help answer the crucial 
question with which I began this Essay: How can courts promote the values 
served by uniformity within a system that ultimately has an ambivalent 
relationship to uniformity? I thus turn to the two major immigration opinions 
she has written since joining the Court—her dissent in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting and her opinion for the Court in Moncrieffe v. Holder—as well as some 
of her work reviewing asylum adjudications while on the Second Circuit, to 
address this dilemma in immigration law. As her opinions suggest, the best 
courts can do in their oversight of the sprawling arms of the regime is to 
promote a kind of consistency in legal interpretation to guide law enforcement 
and administration. By consistency, I mean a predictable approach to resolving 
immigration law questions that pushes administrative actors to adhere to 
consistent legal standards and articulate their reasons for acting, but that 
nonetheless accepts divergent outcomes as non-threatening, particularly when 
they are the product of the system Congress has designed. Sometimes this 
divergence will stem from the federal government’s necessary dependence on, 
or desire to incorporate, state and local actors in its enforcement regime. 
Sometimes it will result from Congress’s interest in writing a code that permits 
equities to be taken into account through the device of administrative 
discretion. But regardless of its source, divergence need not be unfair or 
threatening to good order, particularly if it results from a clearly defined and 
justified design. 
A. Reconciling Uniformity and Immigration Federalism 
Since Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation, the Court has confronted two 
significant cases concerning the scope of states’ authority to enact laws that 
																																																																																																																																						
plea, handing down what was received as a major victory for immigrants’ rights advocates. 
In Chaidez, the Court concluded that Padilla “answered a question about the Sixth 
Amendment’s reach that we had left open, in a way that altered the law of most 
jurisdictions,” thus “break[ing] new ground” and preventing the Court’s holding from 
applying retroactively. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor in a sense 
deflated the significance of Padilla by finding that it amounted to nothing more than long-
standing application of the Supreme Court’s leading Sixth Amendment precedent of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). But she reached her conclusion through matter-of-fact analysis of past 
precedent and suggested that the majority reached its own conclusion based on the 
destabilizing effects Padilla had had on lower court jurisprudence and the perception of 
Padilla as a momentous judgment, rather than as the result of sober and “objective” 
consideration of Court precedent. Id. at 1120.  
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effectively function as immigration regulations—the first time the Court has 
dealt directly with the federal-state balance of power in the immigration arena 
in nearly three decades.25 In both cases, the Justices’ opinions highlight 
different strategies for reconciling the statutory schemes created by Congress 
and the built-up practice of state and local involvement in immigration 
enforcement with the concept of federal exclusivity and the corresponding 
interest in a uniform immigration policy.26 In the first of the two cases, 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,27 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent points the way 
toward an approach that keeps federal law and administration supreme while 
accepting the diversity in enforcement that might come from having an 
integrated regulatory regime—an approach echoed in Justice Kennedy’s far 
more high-profile majority opinion in Arizona v. United States.28  
Whiting required the Court to interpret the meaning of a discrete provision 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. When Congress adopted 
its scheme to sanction employers who hired unauthorized workers, it 
responded to the various state laws then on the books that did the same by 
expressly preempting “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”29 Nearly thirty years after the fact, states 
seeking to re-enter the immigration enforcement game began taking advantage 
of the parenthetical savings clause. Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers 
Act and provided that employers who commit a second violation of the law’s 
prohibition on intentionally or knowingly employing unauthorized aliens 
would have their licenses to do business in the state revoked. Advocates’ 
critiques of Arizona’s interpretation of IRCA’s savings clause drew heavily on 
the negative metaphor of the patchwork, emphasizing that laws such as 
Arizona’s would create multiple and therefore confusing immigration law 
regimes. By attaching far harsher penalties than federal law to the hiring of 
unauthorized workers and giving rise to differential enforcement patterns 
																																																								
25. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (striking down Texas state law that barred 
unauthorized immigrant children from attending public schools on equal protection 
grounds, while noting that, when “faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the 
treatment of aliens, we agree that courts must be attentive to congressional policy,” which 
might “affect the State’s prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of 
aliens”). 
26. Justice Scalia, for example, rejects the concept of exclusivity altogether and insists that the 
states maintain their sovereign authority to prevent “people who have no right to be there” 
from crossing into their territory. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
27. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
28. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012). 
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depending on geography, the laws would undermine values such as notice, 
predictability, and fairness. 
Applying a plain meaning approach to the word “license,”30 the Court held 
that Arizona’s law was not preempted, but rather fell “well within the confines 
of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States.”31 The Court brushed 
aside the possibility of divergence in enforcement in light of congressional 
intent,32 noting that the licensing provision, much like “our federal system in 
general . . . necessarily entails the prospect of some departure from 
homogeneity.”33 The possibility that state laws might lead to greater 
enforcement was of no moment; why would Congress intend to preserve only 
those state sanctions that had no effect?34  
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor each wrote dissenting opinions emphasizing 
uniformity concerns, but based on significantly different theories of the 
statute’s meaning. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, narrowly defined 
the meaning of the word “licensing” in order to limit the impact of the 
enforcement discretion Congress left with the states. By contrast, Justice 
Sotomayor appeared to accept Congress’s decision to involve state and local 
actors in the enforcement of immigration law in a fashion that might lead to 
significant divergence in the scale of penalties imposed on employers in 
different parts of the country. But she rejected the state scheme nonetheless, on 
the ground that it authorized state rather than federal officials to determine 
when IRCA’s prohibitions had been violated. She thus advanced a theory of 
federal control designed to promote consistency in interpretation, if not 
uniformity in outcome.  
																																																								
30. Chief Justice Roberts also emphasized that the state law’s definition of license “largely 
parrots the definition of ‘license’ that Congress codified in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.” Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(8), which states that “‘license’ 
includes the whole or a part of an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, 
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission”).  
31. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. The Court also rejected the Chamber’s implied preemption claim 
based on the severity of the state sanctions and the likelihood that they would interfere with 
the operation of federal law, emphasizing that Congress sought to balance numerous 
interests when it enacted IRCA—a balance that included allocating power between the 
federal government and the states. Id. at 1984. 
32. The majority also rejects Justice Breyer’s consequentialist prediction that employers would 
discriminate on the basis of national origin rather than risk having their licenses revoked on 
the ground that the state law covers only intentional or knowing violations. Id. 
33. Id. at 1979. In assessing the Chamber’s implied preemption claim, the Court rejected the 
concern that the Arizona law upset the balance Congress sought to strike in IRCA because 
the state law—regulating in-state business licensing—did not intrude into an area of 
uniquely federal interest. Id. at 1983. But the majority also emphasized that Arizona took 
pains to ensure that the law closely tracked IRCA in “all material respects.” Id. at 1981. 
34. Id. at 1985. 
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer emphasized that Congress could not have 
intended to give states the broad authority the majority opinion allowed them, 
because it would “eviscerate” the preemption provision itself and undermine 
Congress’s efforts to protect workers from national origin discrimination and 
employers from erroneous prosecution.35 Breyer rejected the majority’s turn to 
dictionary definitions of licensing and concluded that Congress meant the 
clause to have a much narrower, historically specific meaning. He found that 
the clause applied to “the licensing of firms in the business of recruiting or 
referring workers for employment, such as the state agricultural labor 
contractor licensing schemes in existence when the federal Act was created.”36 
He reconstructed the savings clause’s statutory context using the House 
Committee Report,37 post-enactment evidence that the scheme itself gave rise 
to discrimination,38 his own judgments concerning the likely disruptive effects 
of Arizona’s law on the reticulated federal scheme,39 and the history of federal 
and state regulation of agricultural labor contractors.40 In his judgment, the 
majority’s interpretation subverted the Act by upsetting numerous delicate 
compromises Congress had made. The Court’s interpretation gave states the 
power to enact sanctions far greater than those the Act authorized the federal 
government to impose—the “business death penalty,” so to speak. The 
majority’s interpretation thus would lead the federal government to lose 
control of the system of employer sanctions.  
Justice Sotomayor framed her disagreement with the majority by 
emphasizing that Congress expressly wanted the immigration laws to be 
“enforced vigorously and uniformly.”41 But she did not seek to narrow the 
definition of “licensing laws,” implicitly accepting instead the straightforward 
reading of the text given to it by the majority and Arizona. The problem with 
the state law, Justice Sotomayor emphasized, was that it substituted state 
officials’ judgment as to when the law had been violated for a federal 
determination. Such state authority was not contained in the text of the savings 
clause. In fact, the complex structure of adjudication erected by IRCA as a 
whole belied the majority’s interpretation, because the statute reflected 
																																																								
35. Id. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
36. Id. at 1993. 
37. Id. at 1988. 
38. Id. at 1990. 
39. Id. at 1991-93. 
40. Id. at 1993-95. 
41. Id. at 2000 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing language in IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115, 
100 Stat 3359, 3384 (1986), declaring that “[i]t is the sense of the Congress that . . . the 
immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly”). 
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“Congress’ intent to build a centralized, exclusively federal scheme.”42 By 
setting out a clear scheme for what constituted a violation of the law and 
erecting an administrative apparatus and particular procedures to make that 
determination, Congress delegated to federal administrative officials the 
authority to determine when the law had been violated.43 The delegation to 
state and local officials contained in the savings clause contemplated nothing 
more than state and local officials piggybacking on federal determinations that 
a violation had occurred, not the authority to decide complicated questions of 
immigration law involving whether a non-citizen was authorized to work.44  
Despite rejecting the majority’s reading on the ground that it “subjects 
employers to a patchwork of enforcement schemes,”45 this approach still 
accepts a potentially broad form of state involvement in the system. It 
implicitly acknowledges the possibility that employers in some states will face 
more severe sanctions than employers in other states subject only to federal 
sanctions. In other words, Justice Sotomayor’s reading accepts certain 
departures from federal baselines, recognizing Congress’s expressed interest in 
having a full range of sanctions available to it, including sanctions that could 
only be imposed by state officials.46  
But the vision in her dissent is still of federal monopoly in the definition of 
the law’s meaning.47 Even when Congress expressly authorizes states to enforce 
federal law, control over the meaning of federal law remains in the hands of the 
federal administrators to whom that authority has been clearly delegated. The 
centralization of adjudication helps ensure consistency in the interpretation of 
the law, even as the full scope of the law’s enforcement may diverge depending 
on geography.48 
																																																								
42. Id. at 2000-02. 
43. The majority rejected this argument, also made by the Chamber, on the ground that “the 
text of IRCA’s savings clause says nothing about state licensing sanctions being contingent 
on prior federal adjudication.” Id. at 1979 (majority opinion). 
44. Id. at 2003 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 2004 (“Licensing and other types of business-related permissions are typically a matter 
of state law, however.”).  
47. In other words, her approach gives broader effect to Congress’s apparent desire to provide 
states with regulatory space than Justice Breyer’s efforts to narrow the types of penalties the 
savings clause permits states to impose, potentially generating greater divergence in the 
law’s implementation around the country, assuming other states follow Arizona’s lead. 
48. It is far from clear whether, in practice, the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) actually will 
lead to differential enforcement. See Judith Gans, Arizona’s Economy and the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act, UDALL CENTER FOR STUD. IN PUB. POL’Y 14 tbl.6 (Dec. 2008), http://udallcenter 
.arizona.edu/immigration/publications/2008_GANS_lawa.pdf (finding limited enforcement 
of LAWA after its enactment). Of course, even if the state applies its sanctions infrequently, 
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Echoes of this understanding of how state law enforcement can be 
incorporated into the implementation of federal law, while maintaining the 
latter’s integrity, appear in the majority’s opinion in Arizona v. United States.49 
In Arizona, the Court confronted an omnibus state law designed in numerous 
ways to sanction and deter illegal immigration. Arizona framed S.B. 1070 as 
simply enforcing federal standards,50 but the Court held that most of its 
provisions were inconsistent with congressional design. The Court clearly had 
in mind a more complex conception of said design than the mirror-image 
theory advanced by Arizona.  
The design, in fact, paralleled the approach Justice Sotomayor detailed in 
her Whiting dissent. Much as Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress 
intended federal adjudicators to determine the meaning of and identify 
violations of federal law through the procedures Congress had erected, the 
Court in Arizona assumed that Congress wanted its law’s prohibitions to be 
enforced according to the priorities determined by the federal administration.51 
The meaning of federal law, though it might evolve over time, was to be 
																																																																																																																																						
the harsher penalties could lead to different hiring calculations by employers in Arizona than 
would otherwise have been the case. See Magnus Lofstrom et al., Lessons from the 2007 Legal 
Arizona Workers Act, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 26 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ppic.org 
/content/pubs/report/R_311MLR.pdf (concluding that “LAWA significantly hampered 
formal employment opportunities among unauthorized workers”). 
49. Arizona ultimately limited what could have been Whiting’s reach in permitting state and 
local involvement in immigration enforcement. The Whiting majority rejected the 
Chamber’s implied preemption theory—an approach the Court could well have re-purposed 
to reject the federal government’s implied preemption challenges to most of S.B. 1070. After 
all, several of the state law’s provisions meticulously incorporated federal standards or 
amounted to regulation in the traditional state domains of employment and law 
enforcement. 
50. Importantly, at least one of the provisions of S.B. 1070 diverged in substance from the 
corresponding congressional scheme. By criminalizing unauthorized work, instead of merely 
targeting employers who hired unauthorized workers as federal law does, the state law 
adopted a very different regulatory approach from IRCA, underscoring that a mirror image 
theory of state enforcement alone could not have saved all of Arizona’s law. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2503-05 (2012). 
51. See, e.g., id. at 2502-03 (“If § 3 of the Arizona statute were valid, every State could give itself 
independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations, ‘diminish[ing] the 
[Federal Government]’s control over enforcement’ and ‘detract[ing] from the ‘integrated 
scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.’ . . . Were § 3 to come into force, the State would 
have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even 
in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine 
that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.” (citation omitted)); id. at 2505 (“Although 
§ 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful 
employment—it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized 
that a ‘[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as 
conflict in overt policy.’” (citation omitted)). 
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determined by federal officials. Arizona’s parroting of the language of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was thus insufficient to save a scheme 
that could have led state officials to make divergent enforcement choices. 
Though I would not claim that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Whiting served 
as any sort of concrete template for the majority’s reasoning in Arizona, each 
opinion reflects a similar theory of federal lawmaking. Congress delegates to 
executive officials implementation and enforcement authority, through which 
officials construct the meaning of federal law, leaving only as much 
enforcement authority to state officials as is consistent with the federal 
administration’s construction of the law.  
These efforts to assert federal control over the operation of the system 
notwithstanding, however, the Arizona Court kept alive the possibility of some 
divergence in enforcement. It rejected the facial challenge to section 2(B) of the 
state law, which directs state and local police to make a “reasonable attempt . . . 
to determine the immigration status” of any person stopped, detained or 
arrested, if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is 
unlawfully present in the United States.”52 The Court accepted the long-
standing practice of cooperation between state and federal law enforcement in 
immigration policing—interaction reflected in the design of the INA itself—
noting that “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important 
feature of the immigration system.”53 Consistent with the theory of 
enforcement expressed above, federal control over enforcement priorities did 
not necessarily preclude some state involvement in immigration policing. Even 
though this consultation could result in state and local officials making 
inquiries into immigration status where it “seems unlikely that the Attorney 
General would have the alien removed,”54 the Court could not conclude that 
these (probably minor) incursions on federal authority necessarily undermined 
the integrity of federal law enforcement.55  
																																																								
52. Id. at 2507. 
53. Id. at 2508. 
54. Id. The Court’s decision also suggests that the civil liberties concerns that drove much of the 
opposition to section 2(B) will require ongoing vigilance, and one could imagine as-applied 
civil rights challenges to the implementation of section 2(B) that do not depend on showing 
that state and local officials have undermined the uniformity of federal enforcement. Cf. id. 
at 2527-29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And, as the majority notes, if 
the state law results in persons being detained for longer than required by the state law basis 
for the detention in order to verify immigration status, constitutional concerns could arise. 
Id. at 2509 (majority opinion). These potential problems stem not from the breakdown in 
uniformity, per se, but rather from failures of state officials to abide by other requirements 
of federal law. 
55. Id. at 2508. The Court also emphasized that the state statute contained built-in limits that 
could in practice prevent divergence from federal priorities. Local police would be required 
	
uniformity and integrity in immigration law 
15 
	
B. Uniformity and the Interpretation of the INA 
The gap between theory and practice when it comes to uniformity also 
appears in the interpretation and enforcement of the INA itself, even when 
only federal actors are directly involved. In this section, I turn to some 
important examples of Justice Sotomayor’s jurisprudence to highlight two 
sources of that gap: the reliance on state-law convictions as predicates for 
removal and the incorporation of significant levels of administrative discretion 
into the code itself. When confronted with these challenges to uniformity, 
Justice Sotomayor has adopted positions that drive toward consistency in court 
interpretation without necessarily insisting on uniformity of outcome. These 
efforts may be the best the judiciary can do to promote the integrity of federal 
law by constraining the administrators who apply it. 
1. Harmonizing State Law with the INA 
Justice Sotomayor’s most significant immigration opinion to date as a 
member of the Court involved a recurring immigration law question—how to 
treat certain state law convictions for the purposes of federal immigration law. 
In Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Court considered whether a state drug conviction 
constituted illicit drug trafficking under federal law, such that the conviction 
amounted to an “aggravated felony” for the purposes of the INA. Classification 
of the offense of conviction as an aggravated felony would not only have made 
the petitioner removable, but also would have precluded the Attorney General 
from granting him discretionary relief.56  
Petitioner had pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute under Georgia law after being found with the equivalent of two or 
three marijuana cigarettes during a traffic stop. In subsequent removal 
proceedings, the immigration judge ordered his removal on the ground that his 
																																																																																																																																						
to perform status checks against federal databases, and the state law also contained 
provisions intended to protect the civil rights of all persons. In his opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, Justice Alito expresses skepticism that inquiries by state and 
local police into immigration status could interfere with the enforcement of federal law, 
because the federal government at all times “retains the discretion that matters most—that 
is, the discretion to enforce the law in particular cases.” Id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). He also balks at the idea that federal enforcement priorities 
could ever preempt state law, since those priorities are not law and change from 
administration to administration. Id. Indeed, the majority’s conception of preemption does 
have the feel of moving goal posts, making it difficult for state officials to ever know 
whether federal law has preempted their authority to act, including in domains of customary 
state and local participation. 
56. 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013). 
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conviction constituted an aggravated felony.57 The Court granted certiorari to 
resolve a dispute among the courts of appeals over whether a conviction under 
a state statute that criminalizes conduct encompassed by both the felony and 
misdemeanor provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) constitutes a 
conviction for an aggravated felony, which requires that the conviction be for 
an offense that “proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under” the CSA.58 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Moncrieffe’s offense did not amount 
to an aggravated felony.59 The Court reached the conclusion that his state 
conviction did not constitute illicit trafficking under the CSA60 by applying the 
so-called categorical approach (or at least a modified version of it). A state 
offense constitutes a categorical match with a federal offense “only if a 
conviction of the state offense ‘“necessarily” involved . . . facts equating to 
[the] generic [federal offense].’”61 Under this methodology, the Court 
examines what the state offense necessarily involved, not the facts that led to 
conviction. It therefore presumes that the conviction “rested upon [nothing] 
more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized.”62 In Moncrieffe’s case, his 
conviction for possession with intent to distribute did not necessarily require 
the prosecutor to show remuneration or possession of more than a small 
amount of marijuana. His offense therefore could have corresponded either to 
the felony or misdemeanor offense of the CSA.63 Accordingly, under the 
categorical approach, he was not convicted of an aggravated felony. 
The central conceit of the categorical approach is that it promotes uniform 
treatment of convictions by looking not at the underlying facts of a state-law 
conviction, but at the elements of the conviction, assessing whether they map 
onto federal law.64 Perhaps its most important virtue is that it cabins 
																																																								
57. Id. at 1683. 
58. Id. at 1684. 
59. Id. The Court’s statutory analysis was highly technical, and while both the majority and 
dissent apply a version of the categorical approach, they disagree as to who does so faithfully 
or honestly, in part based on their very different views about the meaning of a particular 
section of the Controlled Substances Act. For a discussion of these differences, see infra 
notes 67-68. Understanding the details of this disagreement is less important than 
appreciating the purposes and limitations of the categorical approach.  
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). 
61. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005) 
(plurality opinion) (adopting the categorical approach)).  
62. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)). 
63. Id. at 1686-87. 
64. For a defense of the categorical approach as promoting important systemic values, including 
uniformity and fairness, see Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011). In 
Moncrieffe, the Court clarified that the categorical approach would apply to “generic” crimes, 
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immigration judges’ discretion, preventing them from re-trying immigrants’ 
underlying crimes in order to determine their immigration consequences. 
Justice Sotomayor explicitly rejected the government’s proposal that non-
citizens be given an opportunity during immigration proceedings to 
demonstrate that their convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana, 
precisely because it would have opened the door to “post hoc investigation into 
the facts of predicate offenses,” undermining systemic interests by leading to 
“minitrials conducted long after the fact.”65 Not only would such 
reconsideration of the circumstances of conviction be a drain on the resources 
of a backlogged system, it would present fairness concerns by imposing heavy 
burdens on those in removal proceedings, many of whom might be in 
detention. Relitigation could require non-citizens in civil removal proceedings 
to gather potentially stale evidence without the benefits of the sorts of 
procedural protections that govern the criminal process and might help 
facilitate relitigation of the underlying offense.66 
In dissent, after claiming that a true categorical approach would have led to 
a holding that petitioner’s conviction amounted to an aggravated felony,67 
Justice Alito called for setting the categorical approach aside in circumstances 
like the ones presented by Moncrieffe’s case.68 To buttress his interpretation, 
																																																																																																																																						
but that immigration judges could continue to consider the facts of particular cases for 
offenses that are particular to circumstances. See 133 S. Ct. at 1684-85; see also Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).  
65. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1690. 
66. Id. at 1690-91. 
67. As the government argued, because possession with intent to distribute is presumptively a 
felony under the CSA, any state offense with the same elements constitutes an aggravated 
felony. Moncrieffe’s state offense, the government claimed, consisted of the same elements 
as the CSA felony: (1) possession (2) of marijuana (3) with intent to distribute. Id. at 1687. 
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, indicted the Court’s approach for adding to inconsistencies 
in its analysis of state drug convictions for the purposes of the INA. Id. at 1695 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
68. Id. at 1701 (Alito, J., dissenting). The source of disagreement between the majority and 
dissent revolves around the meaning of the subsection of the CSA that lays out penalties. 
Subsection 841(b)(4) provides that a person who commits one of the unlawful acts 
delineated by the CSA by “distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration 
shall be treated as” a simple drug possessor and therefore as a misdemeanant. Id. at 1686 
(majority opinion). According to the majority, Moncrieffe’s conviction for possession 
standing alone did not reveal whether remuneration was involved, so his conviction could 
have corresponded to either the CSA felony or misdemeanor provision. Under the 
categorical approach, he was not convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. at 1686-87. Justice 
Alito, however, disagreed, siding with every court of appeals to have considered the matter 
and concluding that subsection 841(b)(4) does not establish a separate offense under the 
CSA relevant to the categorical analysis, but rather a mitigating sentencing guideline. Id. at 
1698 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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he pointed to some of the anomalies that the majority’s supposed uniform 
interpretation would create—namely, that the immigration consequences of a 
conviction for possession with intent to distribute would “vary radically” 
depending on the state in which the individual was convicted.69 He contended 
that the majority’s approach would lead to “significant disparity [in] our 
treatment of drug offenders,” which is precisely what the categorical approach 
was supposed to avoid.70 In addition, in some states, major drug trafficking 
crimes would be categorically excluded from the aggravated felony category 
just by virtue of the drafting of state law—a result he did not believe Congress 
could have intended.71 He thus underscored how efforts to promote uniform 
legal interpretation on one level could result in disparate treatment on another. 
Moncrieffe, then, reflects a trade-off: a choice between a system that treats 
like conduct alike but enables administrative actors to determine who precisely 
is similarly situated, and one that applies a consistent rule to cabin the 
discretion of executive actors but empowers the federalism that underlies the 
system to produce disparate and arguably unfair outcomes. Both approaches 
promote a kind of uniformity, but at the expense of another.  
The majority was not blind to the dilemma posed by Justice Alito and the 
government. Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the INA still enabled the 
government to smooth out the anomalies the Court’s approach might produce. 
She made clear that avoiding an aggravated felony designation did not mean 
avoiding removal.72 Moncrieffe was still removable as a “controlled substance 
offender.” The significance of his win before the Court was simply that he 
became eligible for cancellation of removal—a form of relief the INA gives the 
Attorney General the discretion to deny regardless of whether the non-citizen 
meets the eligibility criteria for it in the statute. In other words, if in reality 
Moncrieffe had been a significant drug trafficker, the government could still 
have removed him.  
Now, does the majority’s acknowledgment of this safety valve for the 
government suggest that its categorical classification of offenders like 
Moncrieffe amounts to drawing distinctions without a difference? If the 
discretion removed from the immigration judge when he determines a non-
citizen’s eligibility for relief is simply revived during the discretionary phase of 
																																																								
69. Id. at 1696. 
70. Id. at 1700. 
71. This would result from the fact that many states’ possession with intent to distribute laws 
do not require proof of remuneration or of any minimum quantity, which under the 
categorical approach adopted by the majority would mean that the state law would not map 
onto the relevant federal offense. 
72. Id. at 1692 (majority opinion). 
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his adjudication, do the constraints of the categorical approach amount to 
much?  
Justice Sotomayor offered a potential explanation for why her particular 
framing of the case still served an important constraining function. On the one 
hand, she downplayed the government’s warnings of disparate treatment of 
serious offenders by highlighting the government’s discretion to deny relief 
and therefore still remove drug offenders not found to have committed 
aggravated felonies. But she also expressed an affirmative preference for the 
underinclusiveness of the categorical approach at the threshold eligibility stage. 
In her view, constraining the government on the front end would better 
constrain the government overall by avoiding the costs of relitigating old 
prosecutions.73  
Despite the discretionary safety valve left open to the government, the 
constraints of categorical analysis seem likely to enable greater numbers of 
non-citizens to surmount the eligibility hurdle for relief. This approach 
arguably will produce more uniform legal interpretation and impose fewer 
burdens on individuals in proceedings than the diverse approach to 
adjudication advocated by Justice Alito. A finding of eligibility might in turn 
inform and limit the subsequent discretionary determination, and it might 
cabin ex ante enforcement decisions, too. Congress built the back-end 
discretion of the relief determination into the design of the statute precisely to 
make discretion an exception, rather than part and parcel of the adjudicator’s 
job. Justice Sotomayor’s resolution of the case thus highlights how consistency 
in interpretation, even more than uniformity of outcome, can promote the 
integrity of the system and fairness toward litigants, through the constraints 
consistency imposes on government actors.74 
																																																								
73. Id. at 1692-93. 
74. In the wake of Moncrieffe, commentators characterized the decision as a “reprieve” for non-
citizens because it enabled larger numbers of people convicted of drug crimes to seek relief 
from removal. See Maritza Reyes, Moncrieffe: Lessons in Crimmigration Law, CRIMMIGRATION 
(April 30, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2013/05/01/moncrieffe-lessons-in 
-crimmigration-law.aspx. In commentary while the decision was pending, scholars cited the 
potential proportionality concerns raised by treating marijuana offenses such as Moncrieffe’s 
as aggravated felonies, with all of the attendant consequences. See, e.g., Mark Noferi, 
Symposium: Moncrieffe: Whither Proportionality and the Constitution, CRIMMIGRATION (Oct. 
12, 2012, 4:02 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/10/12/symposium-arguments-are 
-complex-but-suggest-hope-for-moncrieffe.aspx. The decision arguably advanced 
proportionality norms, demonstrating how the Court through statutory interpretation 
might indirectly enforce constitutional norms, or at least protect immigrants’ rights by 
monitoring the implementation of the laws by the government. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (exploring how the Court incorporates constitutional 
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2. Interpretive Consistency in Asylum Adjudications  
The near-impossibility of achieving uniformity in the application of federal 
law has been vividly on display in the adjudication of asylum claims—a process 
that has become notorious for yielding disparate aggregate outcomes based 
sometimes on seemingly arbitrary factors, including the identity of 
adjudicators.75 Pursuant to the INA, the courts of appeals superintend these 
adjudications, and the courts’ criticism of the work of immigration judges has 
been pointed. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has drawn attention 
to what he regards as poorly reasoned agency judgments that in some instances 
have “fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”76 And in response 
to reported disparities in the remand rates in asylum cases by the courts of 
appeals themselves,77 he has said: “This is supposed to be a uniform body of 
																																																																																																																																						
analysis in non-constitutional decisions, taking some of the bite out of the so-called plenary 
power doctrine). 
75. In a 2007 empirical study assessing asylum adjudications from eleven countries by asylum 
officers, immigration judges, the BIA, and the courts of appeals, immigration law scholars 
documented large disparities in grant rates, “even when different adjudicators in the same 
office each considered large numbers of applications from nationals of the same country.” 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 295, 296 (2007) [hereinafter Ramji-Nogales et al., Disparities in Asylum Adjudication]. 
The study showed how certain sociological characteristics of immigration judges affected 
grant rates, highlighting how “the chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only 
by the random assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge, but also in very large 
measure by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by the gender of the 
immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work experience prior to appointment.” 
Id. See also JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE 91-94 (2009) [hereinafter 
RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE] (noting dramatic differences in asylum grant 
rates among regional offices throughout the United States and drop in grant rate after the 
Department of Justice adopted streamlining regulations). 
76. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). In Benslimane, Judge Posner 
arguably expressed a form of empathy—one consistent with the role of the courts of appeals 
in ensuring that administrative action comports with minimal standards of fairness and 
treats claimants on the legal system with basic respect. He wrote: “[t]he Board's action is 
intelligible, but not justifiable, only as punishment for a lawyer’s mistaken belief that the 
filing of the I-485 form (which had already been filed!) would be premature. We are not 
required to permit Benslimane to be ground to bits in the bureaucratic mill against the will 
of Congress. And anyway punishment was not the rationale of the Board’s action, which 
appears to have been completely arbitrary.” Id. at 833. 
77. Scholars have documented significant discrepancies in remand rates among the courts of 
appeals. For instance, an applicant in the Fourth Circuit has only a 1.4% chance of remand, 
whereas the Seventh Circuit remands 36.1% of cases—a rate 700-800% higher than “any of 
the three southern circuits.” RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 74, at 
77; Ramji-Nogales et al., Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, supra note 74, at 387. The 
authors’ recommendations to address the problem consist mostly of better informing court 
of appeals judges through exposure to experts on immigration adjudication and persecution 
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federal law, not something turning on the luck of who you draw for an 
immigration judge or what circuit you happen to be in for the appeal. . . . This 
is a pathological picture that I am painting.”78 
While Justice Sotomayor has not been so explicitly critical, her asylum 
opinions from her time on the Second Circuit do reflect the view that the 
courts should work to simultaneously respect and constrain immigration 
judges and the BIA. On the one hand, in most asylum cases, she and her 
Second Circuit colleagues follow(ed) a fairly straightforward and familiar 
script of deference to the administrative agency,79 and Judge Sotomayor took 
notice when she believed her colleagues had departed from traditions of 
deference and judicial restraint.80 But many of her asylum opinions reflect what 
I would call a BIA-forcing approach, consisting of prods to the agency to 
clearly articulate its interpretations of asylum law and to make them consistent 
over time.81 In some instances, Justice Sotomayor framed her BIA-forcing 
																																																																																																																																						
around the world, and encouraging dialogue outside of the courtroom concerning the 
proper standards of review for board decisions. Id. at 388. 
78. See RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 74, at 79 (citing Judge Richard 
Posner, Speech Before the Chicago Bar Association (Apr. 21, 2008)). 
79. See, e.g., Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008) (laying out deference framework, 
noting that the court reviews BIA interpretations of the INA pursuant to the standard laid 
out in Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and that it gives 
“substantial deference” to BIA decisions interpreting immigration regulations, unless the 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation). 
80. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 327-28 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“Today’s decision marks an extraordinary and unwarranted departure from 
our longstanding principles of deference and judicial restraint. Instead of answering the 
limited question before us . . . the majority has chosen to go far beyond it to address an issue 
that is unbriefed . . . . Indeed, the cases before us, which involve only unmarried petitioners, 
are inappropriate vehicles through which to opine on the merits of the BIA’s position with 
respect to spouses under [the provision of the INA establishing forced sterilization as 
persecution]. . . . [T]he majority’s zeal in reaching a question not before us requires the 
unprecedented step of constricting the BIA’s congressionally delegated powers—a decision 
whose ramifications we are ill-prepared . . . to understand or appreciate fully.”); see id. at 328 
(resisting majority’s interpretation of the INA according to which the granting of asylum 
“can never be based on, in whole or in part, harm to others”). 
81. Such decisions generally arose in the court’s review of single-member, non-precedential, 
summary affirmances by the Board pursuant to the Attorney General’s “streamlining” policy 
designed to enable quicker adjudication of “non-meritorious” cases. With respect to these 
decisions, the courts have not given the agency the typical deference owed but instead 
scrutinized carefully the reasoning (or lack thereof) below. See, e.g., Edimo-Doualla v. 
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Where . . . the BIA summarily adopts or 
affirms an IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision directly. We review de 
novo IJs’ findings concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence, as they present questions 
regarding the application of law to fact. Moreover, ‘using an inappropriately stringent 
standard when evaluating an applicant’s testimony constitutes legal, not factual error, and 
we review de novo whether such a standard has been used.’ We review IJs’ factual findings, 
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prods as part of the court’s duty to ensure uniform and therefore fair treatment 
of asylum applicants.82 And often they were accompanied by careful review of 
the factual record before the immigration judge, not to second-guess his or her 
factual findings, but to ensure that the judge’s legal conclusions were actually 
supported by the facts before him or her.83  
But given what we know about the disparate outcomes at the 
administrative level, not to mention among the courts of appeals, does the 
emphasis in any given opinion on promoting uniformity in law have a naïve 
quality to it? As I noted at the outset of this Essay, harmonization can be 
challenging, especially with respect to the application of open-ended standards. 
For example, the process of applying the INA’s definition of “refugee” to novel 
circumstances, such as the evolution of China’s family planning policy, seems 
likely to lead to disparate outcomes whether arbitrary factors related to the 
adjudicators’ identities are in play or not. The open-textured nature of the 
definition of “refugee,” the centrality of credibility determinations to the 
																																																																																																																																						
however, under the substantial evidence standard, sustaining all findings that are ‘supported 
by “reasonable, substantial, and probative” evidence in the record when considered as a 
whole.’” (citations omitted)). 
82. See, e.g., Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, where an agency has not 
spoken with sufficient clarity as to its interpretation of the law, courts will remand to the 
agency to issue a precedential opinion, urging the agency to give reasons for its judgments 
and provide guidance with respect to the law); Jiang v. Bureau of Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., 520 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“To further the goals of uniformity and 
fairness that prompted our remand on the same issue in Ying Zheng, we remand this case to 
the BIA for it to articulate a consistent position on whether and under what conditions 
forced insertion of IUD constitutes persecution.”); Chen v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 461 
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We require that the IJ say enough for us to understand and review 
the reasons for rejecting applicant’s testimony.”); Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 
2006) (concluding that immigration judge misunderstood applicant’s testimony about 
being fined by officials in Fujian Province for not being sterilized after having a second 
child, hearing it instead as testimony that she was fined for actually having a second child, 
which Chinese family planning policy permitted her to do, and emphasizing that “[t]he fact 
that the agency has denied relief primarily on credibility grounds cannot insulate a decision 
from review—adverse credibility determinations must be based on specific, cogent reasons 
that bear a legitimate nexus to findings”). 
83. See, e.g., Edimo-Doualla, 464 F.3d 276 (rejecting IJ’s conclusion that petitioner had to show 
signs of physical abuse to establish persecution and finding that IJ’s conclusion that his 
arrests were not for political activity fails to take account of his testimony to the contrary); 
Chen, 461 F.3d 153 (finding that substantial evidence did not support IJ’s denial of asylum, 
because IJ relied on discrepancies between identification numbers on different documents 
without exploring potential reasons for discrepancies, including that they might have been 
the result of record-keeping changes made by the Chinese government to account for Y2K 
problems). 
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adjudication of a claim,84 and the discretionary component of the INA’s asylum 
provisions85 all push against uniformity in outcome. Disparities in adjudication 
of the asylum laws thus may be inevitable whatever the courts do. And 
confusion can also be a signal of a poorly drafted statute or of an inherently 
difficult standard to apply to novel circumstances. In these cases, percolation 
and the generation of multiple theories might in the long run produce better 
interpretations.  
But as reflected in Judge Sotomayor’s opinions, the courts of appeals can 
and do play a complementary and useful role in relation to the administrative 
process, namely by striving for consistency and integrity in legal interpretation, 
at least within their own circuits.86 In Zheng v. Gonzales, for example, Justice 
Sotomayor acknowledged the “array of positions” taken by the courts of 
appeals on the question of when forced insertion of an IUD constitutes 
persecution. The court remanded the single-member BIA decision nonetheless 
to give the Board the opportunity to articulate its position on the novel and 
confused question. Her opinion reflected both the court’s interest in 
demanding reasoned decision-making by the adjudicator and the interest in 
having difficult interpretive questions percolate up through the channels of 
review (and by extension, perhaps, across the courts).87 Such efforts can help 
make disparities in outcome more tolerable by ensuring that they stem from 
the vagaries we should expect from a complex legal system and not from the 
absence of guiding legal standards and independent supervision of the 
implementation of those standards.88  
																																																								
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(iii) (2006)(“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, 
or responsiveness of the applicant or witness.”). 
85. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Secretary . . . or the Attorney General may grant asylum to 
an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and procedures 
established [by the Secretary or Attorney General] if the Secretary . . . or the Attorney 
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 
101(a)(42)(A).”). 
86. See supra note 77 (discussing modest reforms for the courts of appeals to promote 
consistency in asylum adjudications). 
87. 497 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2007). 
88. For an exploration of the importance of consistency in adjudication and an argument that 
disparities are to be expected and tolerated in order to promote values such as decisional 
independence, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and 
the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 415-16 (2007) (“I argue here that these 
impulses should be resisted. There are times when we simply have to learn to live with 
unequal justice because the alternatives are worse. Disparities in asylum approval rates just 
might be one of those instances. As long as adjudicators are flesh-and-blood human beings, 
as long as the subject matter is ideologically and emotionally volatile, and as long as limits to 
the human imagination constrain the capacity of legislatures to prescribe specific results for 
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As a nominee, Judge Sotomayor seemed well aware of the limited but 
important role of the federal courts in maintaining the law’s integrity in a 
world of elusive uniformity. When asked during her confirmation hearings by 
Senator Richard Durbin whether she agreed with Judge Posner’s estimation of 
the quality of the BIA’s work, Judge Sotomayor acknowledged that the system 
of adjudication as managed by the Department of Justice had given rise to 
procedural and adjudicative challenges that led to “cooperation between the 
courts and the immigration officials in how to handle these cases, how to 
ensure that the process would be improved.”89 She described the courts as 
being in “dialogue” with the agency and acknowledged the Department of 
Justice’s efforts to better manage the process. But she also focused attention on 
Congress, too, emphasizing that the legislature was the branch with the power 
to allocate the resources necessary to improve adjudication. She was realistic 
about the power of the courts: all they can do is “ensure that due process is 
applied in each case according to the law required for the review of these 
cases.”90 In other words, amidst systemic complexity, uniformity of outcome 
may be unachievable, but by holding adjudicators to consistent standards, a 
system that produces divergent outcomes can still have integrity. 
conclusion 
The rhetoric of uniformity looms large in immigration law, both as framed 
by courts and as debated in the political arena. But as is true across legal 
domains, the achievement of uniformity in the interpretation and application 
of federal immigration law proves elusive. Whatever one thinks about the 
importance of the objective, our immigration laws are drafted in a way that 
makes uniformity an unrealistic aspiration. In addition to being affected by the 
																																																																																																																																						
every conceivable fact situation, there will be large disparities in adjudicative outcomes and 
justice will depend, in substantial part, on the luck of the draw.”). For an argument that 
enhancing judicial supervision of IJs and the BIA would not significantly help address 
problematic disparities, because “the problems run much deeper than a lack of supervision 
. . . [T]hey are rooted in flawed hiring processes, a lack of resources, . . . insufficient 
ongoing training, and the ever-present threat of political oversight by Justice Department 
officials,” see RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 74, at 97-98. For a 
detailed set of policy prescriptions designed to address the disparity problem at the 
administrative level, see id. at 100-17 (including various proposals to improve the quality of 
adjudication by de-politicizing it, expanding adjudicators’ access to resources and training, 
hiring judges with better qualifications, and reforming BIA procedures). 
89. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56940/html/CHRG 
-111shrg56940.htm. 
90. Id. 
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ordinary features of a complex system of federal administration made up of 
multiple decision-makers, several features of immigration law itself mean that 
uniformity will be more rhetoric than reality. The reliance on state and local 
actors in enforcement, the fact that state law serves as a predicate for numerous 
immigration offenses, and the open-ended standards and delegated discretion 
that give administrative actors considerable room to maneuver all ensure that 
conflict will often thwart harmony.  
Yet several of Justice Sotomayor’s opinions demonstrate that the work of 
the courts in superintending the system is not futile. The courts can bring 
integrity to the system without necessarily ensuring uniformity in outcome or 
administration, particularly by holding administrative actors to transparent 
legal standards and forcing them to give reasons for their actions. These 
tendencies in the immigration opinions Justice Sotomayor has authored cohere 
with emerging themes in the evaluation of her jurisprudence—that she pays 
rigorous attention to the factual and institutional features of a case and believes 
in hewing to what can be readily identified as legal principles. This approach 
may reflect a cabined view of the courts’ role in managing any given regulatory 
scheme, but it also advances some of the same values as the rhetorically 
appealing but practically unattainable principle of uniformity, serving systemic 
and individual interests in justice through fidelity to law.   
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